Income Taxes (SFAS 109), was silent on how income tax uncertainties arising from tax planning should be reflected in financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), FIN 48 provides guidance on accounting for tax contingencies.
Taxpayers are often uncertain whether the tax authority will assess an additional tax payment upon audit of their income tax returns. The potential for these future tax payments (i.e., tax contingencies) implies that the tax liability on the originally filed tax return may be too low (e.g., because too little income was reported, too many deductions were reported, the character of income reported or credit taken is inappropriate). The financial reporting problem that FIN 48 seeks to address is how to reflect these 'uncertain tax benefits', realized on the tax return, in financial statements during the time that any potential tax disputes remain unresolved. Each period a firm must assess how much of the tax benefits attributable to uncertain tax positions should be recognized in its financial statements. FIN 48 sets forth a process for evaluating when uncertain tax benefits should be recognized, how they should be measured, and the requirement to disclose the liability for uncertain tax benefits claimed on its tax return that are not permitted to be recognized in its financial statements. FIN 48 terms this liability, or the tax reserve, the 'unrecognized tax benefit' (UTB).
This review paper evaluates the findings of the academic literature on FIN 48 in the context of the post-implementation review (PIR) process by assessing whether FIN 48 met the objectives which led to its issuance. There are several important caveats to the literature review. The first caveat is that there are only four papers published in academic journals that study the impact of FIN 48 in a context that can address the post-implementation review objectives outlined below.
The reasons the literature is so sparse are twofold. FIN 48's effective date was just over four years ago, which is a short tenure for researchers given that these tax reserve disclosures are not available until almost a year after adoption and the roughly three year review process required for publication. However, there are some interesting working papers that show promise and each relevant paper is discussed without regard to its publication status.
The other reason for the relatively few studies on the effects of FIN 48 is that there was virtually no publicly-available information on tax reserves before the implementation of FIN 48.
One of the most powerful empirical research design methodologies for assessing the impact of a new accounting policy is to compare behavior of those affected before and after the change. Due to the lack of information on tax reserves prior to FIN 48, researchers have no ability to make a pre-versus post-FIN 48 comparison of tax reserve activity. As discussed later, some firms occasionally disclosed material changes to their tax reserve balance prior to FIN 48. However, because these disclosures were infrequent and virtually always reveal reserve decreases, any analysis of these firms suffers from selection bias. This means that firms choosing to disclose may not be representative of the population of firms and hence, any inferences are not generalizable to the entire population of firms. Also, since researchers must rely on publicly available financial statement data for information on a firm's tax reserves, there is no ability to separate measurement from recognition issues. From the researcher's perspective, any amount recognized in the financial statements is also presumed to represent the appropriate measurement of the tax reserve.
The second important caveat is that empirical archival research (i.e., research which uses data collected from financial statements) cannot infer causality (i.e., does some change create an outcome) about the effect of a policy change on firm behavior. The reason for this limitation is that, unlike a laboratory setting, researchers do not have a treatment and control group. In order to infer causality, all attributes of the treatment and control groups must be identical except that one group receives treatment (or is affected by the policy change) and the other is not. Clearly, this type of research design is impossible for a change in accounting policy. Not only are all firms subject to the same rules, but there are other events that occur in the economy simultaneously with changes in accounting rules. Because researchers are limited from studying true cause and effect, empirical archival research does not allow researchers to make normative statements (i.e., make determinations about what is the right or wrong policy). That is, empirical research cannot conclude that one accounting regime is better than another, or that a policy is good or bad or right or wrong.
The final caveat is that empirical archival research cannot infer what management or investors think or feel.
1 Some studies examine whether markets move with the release of information about a new accounting policy and the new information it provides in the financial statements. However, this statistical relation cannot speak to whether the market believes the new information to be relatively better. Because little to no tax reserve information was provided in the financial statements before FIN 48, evidence of a response to new information does not provide insight as to whether market participants believe that the measurement of tax reserve information after FIN 48 is more informative than the pre-FIN 48 measurement of tax reserves.
1 Field studies and surveys are used to evaluate these issues.
The literature review is organized based on the following post-implementation review objectives:
1. Determine whether the standard is accomplishing its stated purposes. 
a. Motivation for FIN 48
The motivation for FIN 48 grew out of the SEC's staff concern about the applicability of SFAS 109 to uncertainty created by tax motivated transactions that could lead to a material overstatement of tax benefits recognized (i.e., understatement of potential tax liabilities) in financial statements (SFSAC, 2004) . The lack of guidance under SFAS 109 led to diversity in accounting practices with respect to accounting for tax uncertainty.
Anecdotally, firms were using a variety of methods for determining tax reserves. The academic research assumes that firms were following SFAS 5, Accounting for Contingencies, and accruing the expected value of the outcome from potential tax assessments. 3 Regardless of whether uncertain tax benefits were recognized prematurely in financial statements pre-FIN 48, there was no specific guidance on the disclosure of tax reserve information. Hence, academics presumed that although required to disclose material contingencies, firms had substantial discretion in defining "material" under SFAS 5. The widely held belief was that this diversity in practice resulted in inconsistent accounting for income tax reserves and limited the availability of information about these reserves to market participants.
As discussed in the caveat section of the introduction, tax reserve information was very limited pre-FIN 48. Therefore, only a few studies examine the financial reporting of income tax uncertainties before the implementation of FIN 48. Those that do, however, provide key insights into pre-FIN 48 practices, particularly regarding disclosure of tax reserves. Generally, this research finds diversity in disclosure of firms' tax reserves. As discussed below, although there is some evidence of diversity in measurement of tax reserves, evidence is limited and indirect. Gleason and Mills (2002) study 100 large firms from 1987 to 1995 to investigate firms' decisions to disclose tax reserves in their financial statements. In 900 firm-year observations, the paper finds that only 27 percent contain any disclosure of a tax reserve (including information regarding its mere existence) and only 8.1 percent provide the detailed information required by SFAS 5. Linking proprietary tax assessment data from the IRS with financial statement data, the paper finds that the probability of a tax reserve disclosure increases with the size of the firm's 3 Recall that firms did not discuss their accounting for tax reserves in their footnotes pre-FIN 48.
IRS assessment. 4 However, the very largest assessments drive this result; many "material" assessments (based on a 5-percent-of-income benchmark) are not disclosed. Overall, Gleason and Mills (2002) finds evidence of pre-FIN 48 diversity of tax reserve disclosure practices arising, in part, from how firms define the materiality threshold for disclosure.
Using data from later time periods, Blouin and Tuna (2007) Because so few firms disclose any detailed information about tax reserves, none of the aforementioned studies are able to investigate diversity in tax reserve measurement. However, there are papers that study whether researcher-developed estimates of the pre-FIN 48 tax reserves are correlated with measures of potential tax assessments. Each of the papers discussed below suggests that, on average, firms with greater potential tax assessments recorded larger tax reserves. Gleason and Mills (2002) find that IRS assessments are positively correlated with an authordeveloped estimate of firms' tax reserves. 6 Using the same estimate of tax reserves as Gleason and Mills (2002) , Lisowsky (2010) reports a positive association between the estimated tax reserve and the incidence of reportable transaction disclosures made on IRS Form 8886 in a sample of 1,769 firms. 7 Finally, Gleason and Mills (2010) investigate whether auditor-provided tax services (APTS) improve the estimate of tax reserves by testing the adequacy of reserves for IRS disputes from 2000 to 2002. The study finds firms that purchase APTS are, on average, fully reserved for IRS disputes, while other firms record additional reserves in the year the IRS finishes its examination. This study suggests that the independent auditor may play a non-trivial role in preventing premature recognition of tax benefits. 8 Although each of these papers suggests that firms with greater (or more) uncertain tax positions were recording larger estimated tax reserves, none of these papers observe the actual tax reserve balance so they are unable to provide conclusive evidence about the diversity in measurement pre-FIN 48.
Finally, there are three studies that find evidence consistent with firms using pre-FIN 48 tax reserves for earnings management. These studies come closest to broaching the topic of measurement diversity. If firms use the subjectivity required to measure tax reserves in order to meet earnings objectives, then diversity in measurement may arise from variation in firms'
6 The authors estimate the IRS related tax reserve by comparing the sum of current federal tax expense to the sum of the income tax payable recorded on firms' IRS Form 1120. Note that this estimate is a very rough approximation due to the variation in consolidation rules for GAAP reporting and tax reporting. However, on average, aggregate current federal tax expense should equal aggregate taxes due reported on the firm's Form 1120. 7 To combat the rise of corporate tax shelters in the United States, in 2000 the IRS issued regulations under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §6011 requiring taxpayers to disclose on Form 8886, Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, their participation in various activities known administratively as "reportable transactions" that are described in specific IRS notices, rulings, and guidance. 8 The authors conjecture that APTS improves the adequacy of tax reserves through knowledge spillover between the auditors and the tax preparers. Thus, the finding that other firms are not adequately reserved does not prove that this was an intentional understatement on the part of the firm. Also note that this paper investigates adequacy, not accuracy of tax reserves, so it may be the legal liability for auditors selling both tax and audit services to the same firm ensures 'adequate' tax reserves.
financial reporting objectives. Consider two firms that both have an uncertain tax position that creates an expected future tax payment ranging from $90 to $110 depending on, for example, one's interpretation of existing case law and/or opinion of the tax authorities' willingness to settle at a particular dollar amount. Further, assume that in the absence of financial reporting objectives, both firms would decide to record a reserve of $100. If one firm is potentially going to miss its earnings target by $10 if it recognizes a tax reserve of $100 (resulting in a decrease to earnings of $100), then it may have incentives to recognize a reserve of only $90. Similarly, if the other firm is going to beat its earnings target by $10 with a tax reserve of $100, it may choose instead to recognize a tax reserve of $110 -this overstatement is referred to as a cookie jar reserve and facilitates future earnings management (i.e., earnings smoothing). If the firm's judgment regarding the appropriate tax reserve amount is influenced by reporting objectives, then earnings management may affect reserve amounts recognized by firms with identical facts and circumstances regarding the uncertain tax position. Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004) finds evidence that unusual decreases in tax expense between the third and fourth quarters are correlated with an increased frequency of firms meeting fourth quarter analysts' forecasts of earnings. The authors conjecture that this finding could result from cookie jar behavior enabled by the subjectivity in recording tax reserves under SFAS 5. Gupta et al. (2011) finds that tax reserve reversals, when disclosed, are associated with an increased probability of firms meeting analysts' forecasts. 9 In a sample of 1,446 firms from 1999 to 2004, Blouin and Tuna (2007) finds that incentives to smooth earnings explain some crosssectional variation (i.e., variation across firms) in their financial statement-based estimate of 9 Because tax reserve increases (income-decreasing) were rarely disclosed, Gupta et al. (2011) cannot examine whether tax reserves were used pre-FIN 48 to smooth accounting earnings.
changes in firms' tax reserves. 10 Although the overall conclusion from these studies is that the discretion afforded under SFAS 5 with respect to recording tax reserves was used opportunistically, the extent to which this was the case is unclear. Also, it is important to note that none of the papers discussed is able to explicitly link changes in tax reserves with meeting or beating an earnings benchmark.
b. Stated Purpose of FIN 48
The purpose of FIN 48 was to increase relevance and comparability in financial reporting of income taxes and to provide more information to users of financial statements about income tax uncertainty (FIN 48). To this aim, the standard imposes consistent criteria for recognition, measurement, and mandatory disclosure guidelines. Relevance is a fundamental qualitative characteristic of useful financial information and means that information is capable of making a difference in the decisions made by users. To make a difference, the information must have both predictive value and confirmatory value (SFAC 8). Comparability is an enhancing qualitative characteristic that enables users to identify and understand differences in, and differences among, items.
The evidence regarding the increased comparability in the accounting for uncertain tax benefits is limited to one paper whose inferences are indirect at best. No study has addressed increased relevance because the stock market reaction to tax reserve information was never examined prior to FIN 48. resulted in a substantial increase in information on tax uncertainties in firms' financial statements. Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2007) examines the adoption disclosures of the 100 largest non-regulated, non-financial companies. Notably, all of these large firms report the balance of the UTB as of January 1, 2007. 12 In contrast, less than one third of large firms examined in Gleason and Mills (2002) disclosed any tax reserve information pre-FIN 48.
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11 Lee and Swenson (2009) finds that (non-tax) discretionary accruals declined post-FIN 48 and concludes that FIN 48 was effective in reducing earnings managed by ruling out the possibility that earnings management simply shifted from tax to non-tax accruals. However, the study does not directly test for reduced earnings management via the tax reserve. 12 caveats this for a handful of firms but concludes that the UTB balance can be inferred from the disclosure. Robinson and Schmidt (2011) examines this issue in detail; i.e., the need to infer information from Studies that examine adoption disclosures also potentially speak (albeit indirectly) to the issue of increased comparability. Consider that Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2010) documents in their sample of 100 large firms that 40 firms increase the tax reserve at adoption, 40 firms decrease the tax reserve, and 20 firms experience no change. Given that FIN 48 introduced a consistent set of measurement criteria that all firms apply, the relatively symmetric distribution of adoption adjustments around zero implies that firms are moving away from their diverse practices, which in turn, suggests increased comparability. 14 This descriptive evidence, however, does not allow us to understand the degree to which the diversity in practice was reduced. 15, 16 III.
Is decision useful information being reported?
One objective of the post-FIN 48 implementation review was to ascertain whether FIN 48 is useful to investors. By useful, the FASB means that the information contained in the disclosure FIN 48 disclosures that use ambiguous language. See Section VI of our paper for a discussion of the variation in disclosure regarding other disclosure requirements of FIN 48, i.e., other than the tax reserve balance. 13 Although they do not address any of the post-implementation review objectives, several other studies also present detailed descriptive data on FIN 48 first quarter adoption disclosures (Dunbar, Kolbasovsky, and Phillips, 2007; Nichols, Baril, and Briggs, 2007; Robinson and Schmidt, 2011) as well as the first annual disclosures (Nichols, 2008) . 14 Consistency is discussed extensively in section IV. 15 Dunbar et al. (2007) examine the S&P 500 calendar-year end firms and, among other things, highlight variation in first quarter adoption effects for clients of the Big 4 audit firms. One observation noted in the study is that only one audit firm was associated with client firms showing increases to the reserve at FIN 48 adoption that was greater in absolute value (mean and median) than decreases. 16 Langmead and Keeling (2010) concludes that FIN 48 did not substantially impact the reporting of tax uncertainties by examining first quarter adoption disclosures of the Dow 30. The authors note that adoption adjustments were "slight", suggesting that these firms "do not appear to have taken advantage of the lack of specific guidance or standards before FIN 48" (pg. 31). However, one cannot draw such a conclusion at the aggregate level without noting the underlying firm-level variation. For instance, the adoption adjustments as a percent of the beginning balance in the UTB range from 0 to 32 percent, with a mean and median of 8 and 5 percent, respectively. Interestingly, the correlation between the adoption adjustment (as a percent of the beginning balance in the UTB) and the UTB (both in raw values and as a percent of total assets) is negative. That firms' adoption adjustments were smaller when the UTB was larger suggests that firms with more significant uncertain tax positions may have spent more time pre-FIN 48 on documenting, evaluating, and properly recording tax reserves.
aided investors in their allocation of capital efficiently across investments (see SFAC No. 8).
Although usefulness refers to investment decisions made by all potential investors including lenders/creditors, this review focuses on equity investors primarily because, to date, these investors are the focus of the academic research. If investors use the information in their investment decisions then there should be a significant statistical association between firms'
UTBs and some measure of firms' market values or stock returns. Essentially, the interest is in understanding whether the information about uncertain tax positions is incorporated into stock price; i.e., is value relevant.
The academic literature has two streams of research that study the effects of changes in accounting standards on investor behavior. The first includes studies that investigate whether the announcement of the standard (or some other change in regulation) creates a market reaction.
These event studies attempt to measure whether the market believes that the new standard will have an economic impact on firms. In a well-executed event study, a significant stock market response on an event date captures market participants' perceptions about the potential costs and benefits from adopting new accounting standards. Note that these studies do not differentiate the market's response across firms but rather consider the response in aggregate across all firms in the economy. The second stream of research includes studies that investigate whether investors (or potential investors) in a particular firm use the information in their investment decisions. Frischmann et al. (2008) also studies whether the market impounds into price the information contained in the opening UTB balance of 334 S&P 500 firms. Although the paper finds no significant association between the total UTB balance and cumulative abnormal returns, the paper documents a significant positive association between returns and the portion of the UTB that affects the firm's earnings (i.e., the portion related to permanent differences). The paper provides two explanations for this result. First, if the large UTB represents aggressive tax planning, then the positive association is consistent with investors viewing aggressive tax planning as value-enhancing. Second, the result can be interpreted as evidence that the market views the firm's earnings as being understated because the presumption that all tax positions must be viewed by the tax authorities leads the firm to overstate unrecognized tax benefits (i.e., overstate the reserve).
Three additional studies, Song and Tucker (2008) , Koester (2011) and Robinson and Schmidt (2011) , also document a significant positive association between the UTB and measures of firm performance. Song and Tucker (2008) Although sparse, the academic literature is remarkably consistent in its finding that the market appears to effectively "recognize" a portion of the unrecognized tax benefit in its valuation of firms. It would be interesting to know how FIN 48 changed the market's assessment of the UTB. Unfortunately, the dearth of disclosures regarding the tax contingency prior to FIN 48 provides researchers little opportunity to investigate how FIN 48 altered the landscape for investors.
IV. Is the standard operational?
The focus of this objective is to ascertain whether the standard is clear and understandable by those who are implementing it, thereby speaking to the standard's consistent application. As outlined in the introduction, empirical archival work cannot speak to these criteria of the objective because clarity and understanding are based on management's perceptions. Therefore, the focus of this section is consistency, which potentially leads to comparability of tax reserve information in the FIN 48 regime.
Consistency refers to the use of the same methods for the same items, either from period to period within a reporting entity or in a single period across entities (SFAC No. 8). Consistency helps achieve the goal of comparability, an enhancing qualitative characteristic of financial accounting information that increases its usefulness. 19 According to SFAC No. 8, information is "useful if it can be compared with similar information about other entities and with similar information about the same entity for another period or another date". Whether FIN 48 is being applied consistently is of interest because of its effect on the usefulness of information provided pursuant to the new standard.
a. Measurement
Inconsistent application of FIN 48's recognition and measurement guidelines across firms may arise due to variation in financial reporting objectives. 20 Hanlon and Heitzman (HH, 2010) includes a discussion of various measures of tax avoidance used in the academic literature; the 19 According to FASB, SFAC No. 8, the objective of financial reporting is to provide information that is useful in assessing both cash flow prospects and stewardship. 20 It is well recognized that firms strategically choose accounting policies and procedures to manipulate their results to attain some reporting objective, such as meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast, avoid reporting an earnings decline, avoid reporting losses, (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999) . most recent addition is the unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) disclosed pursuant to FIN 48. 21 The paper cautions researchers that the amount of UTB recorded in the financial statements is subject to the judgment of management and may be used to achieve reporting objectives. 21 See Section VI of this paper for a further discussion of academic research related to using the unrecognized tax benefit as a measure of 'tax aggressiveness' or 'tax risk'. 22 Cazier et al.'s analysis suffers from the "backing-out" problem discussed in Lim and Lustgarten (2003) and Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2003) . The "backing-out" problem occurs when the measure being studied, e.g., unmanaged earnings, is estimated (because "true" unmanaged earnings are unobservable by the researcher) by subtracting the balance of the specific account being used for earnings management, e.g. the discretionary accrual. Because the observed unmanaged earnings balance is now a function of the discretionary accrual, the research induces a negative relationship between the variables he/she is studying.
It is important to note that even if firms apply the accounting guidance prescribed under FIN 48 consistently, the information produced may not be comparable. The reason is that the process of evaluating a firm's tax positions is highly subjective, and the effect of management's judgment in evaluating tax positions is unclear. The new standard attempts to limit the impact of discretion in two key ways. First, the recognition step focuses on the tax position's technical merits, rather than audit probabilities or litigation/settlement intentions. Second, if the 'more likely than not' threshold based on the technical merits is not met, the determination of the tax reserve is insensitive to the probability assessment.
Understanding the extent to which the discretion afforded under FIN 48 produces different tax reserve amounts is an important part of understanding whether the standard, even consistently applied in practice, creates comparable information. Raby and Raby (2006) and Kimmelfield (2006) point out that FIN 48 reserve calculations require a fairly high level of sophistication and experience (that most companies are lacking), concluding that the standard may not produce "meaningful income measurement" (Raby, pg. 156 ) and the information may suffer from lack of comparability.
Three studies demonstrate this notion. First, Nichols (2008) There is a fairly large body of work that investigates FIN 48 disclosure practices. Although FIN 48 provides detailed disclosure requirements, there appears to be substantial variation in the completeness of these disclosures suggesting that perhaps some aspects of the disclosure are particularly costly or difficult for firms to provide. Clearly, the failure to provide all of the components of the FIN 48 disclosure is a compliance issue. But, depending on the firm's perceived cost of non-compliance with the standard's disclosure requirement, the lack of disclosure may be optimal. This is particularly true when dealing with proprietary information (such as the firm's tax positions).
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Paragraphs 20 and 21 of FIN 48 describe its mandatory annual disclosure requirements.
Firms subject to FIN 48 were concerned that the disclosure requirement might "provide a roadmap for the tax authority that may undercut the firm's bargaining power in the associated tax disputes" (Spatt, 2007) . Given the substantial increase in the amount of information available in financial statements post-FIN 48, researchers compiled the information contained in those disclosures for various samples. Work using these hand-collected samples finds that disclosure practices varied widely.
The lack of consistency in implementing the disclosure guidance of FIN 48 can arise in two ways: i) noncompliance with a standard's mandatory disclosure requirements, and ii) lack of disclosure clarity. The latter implies that the user of the financial statements is required to make an assumption in order to evaluate the information presented. If investors can make different assumptions and come to different conclusions, the information disclosed is not comparable.
Notice that disclosure variation may result in the non-comparability of information for users of financial statements, even if the recognition and measurement process of FIN 48 is implemented consistently.
What is known about disclosure variation comes mainly from three studies; Blouin et al.
(2010), Dunbar et al. (2010) . Other studies generally confirm 26 Thus, it may be useful to consider enforcement issues when designing mandatory disclosure guidelines for proprietary information.
the observations made in these studies (e.g., Nichols et al. 2007 , Nichols 2008 ). Blouin et al.
(2010) offers a detailed discussion and tabulation of adoption disclosures for the 100 largest nonfinancial, non-regulated calendar year-end firms, noting that "inconsistencies remain in the disclosures" (pg. 523). The following things are noted to be unclear: i) whether the gross UTB includes or excludes interest, ii) whether the amount of the UTB that impacts the effective tax rate (ETR) includes or excludes interest, and iii) whether the amount of interest itself is gross or net of the tax benefit. The authors quantify the impact of issue i) by showing that the actual UTB (excluding interest) in their sample could range from $70 billion to $78 billion depending on assumptions about whether the disclosed UTB does or does not include interest. 27 Note that because some firms explicitly included interest while others explicitly excluded interest, the reader could not be certain what firms were doing in the absence of an explicit statement.
Therefore, note that two investors reading the identical FIN 48 information in the footnotes could conclude UTB balances that are 10 percent different. Hence, the clarity of the footnote information to financial statement users is a non-trivial issue.
Robinson and Schmidt (2011) undertake a large scale study that attempts to quantify the quality of FIN 48 first quarter adoption disclosures in 1,000 S&P 1500 firms. By carefully examining the content of adoption disclosures in conjunction with the required disclosures (there were 8 required disclosures), the study develops firm-specific disclosure scores across two dimensions: i) disclosure compliance, and ii) disclosure clarity. 28 In the full sample, there is no single disclosure requirement that achieves a 100 percent compliance rate, yet the SEC sent only 27 The lower bound of $70 billion assumes that the disclosed UTB includes interest (when firms are not explicit) and the upper bound of $78 billion assumes that the disclosed UTB excludes interest (when firms are not explicit). In the former case, interest would be removed from the disclosed UTB balance, whereas in the latter instance no adjustment would be made to the UTB balance. 28 Note that the study does not examine firms that disclose a $0 UTB because disclosure quality is not relevant.
34 comment letters to these firms regarding FIN 48 issues within 3 years of the disclosure. The largest firms (S&P 500) score highest on compliance and lowest on clarity, while the smallest firms (S&P 600) score highest on clarity and lowest on compliance. As larger firms are more likely to be subject to SEC enforcement, large firms are more 'compliant'. But, because clarity is difficult to enforce, these large firms appear to reduce the information content of the required disclosures through ambiguous language, consistent with observations made by Blouin et al. (2010) .
Aside from the descriptive exercise of quantifying disclosure quality in a large sample, Robinson and Schmidt (2011) has two key empirical findings. First, firms' overall disclosure quality is lower when the proprietary cost of disclosure is expected to be high. 29 The cost of disclosure is captured using various measures of the extent and nature of the firms' tax avoidance activities. This suggests that the observed variation in disclosure is not random and that firms intentionally reduced the transparency of tax reserve information to avoid the potential cost of disclosure. Second, the study finds that the positive market reaction documented in Frischmann et al. (discussed earlier) to the disclosed UTB at adoption is attenuated by high disclosure quality. This finding implies that investors value (reward) a lack of transparency in a setting where the proprietary cost of disclosure is high. These findings are interesting in light of the fact that standard setters designed FIN 48 disclosure requirements for the benefit of investors. Dunbar et al. (2010) focuses its attention on the look-forward disclosure required by FIN 48 (FIN 48,  ¶21d) on the basis that disclosure of this information has a particularly high proprietary 29 The phrase 'proprietary cost' refers to situations where information disclosed by a firm induces an adverse reaction from an 'opponent' that may prove costly to the disclosing firm. The opponent may either be another competing firm or a political agency (i.e., the IRS). For example, if firms are required to disclose details of their product pricing in their financial statements then competitors could use this information to undercut firms' bids.
cost. The study documents that 14 percent of their 280 S&P 500 firms provide a look-forward disclosure at adoption and 1 percent did not provide the disclosure at the end of the first year of adoption (note that "disclosure" includes a statement about a possible reserve change of an indeterminable amount). Though the incidence of the disclosure increased, the study notes that the informativeness of the disclosure continued to vary greatly. Only one half of the firms accurately predict the direction of the expected change, and only one fourth accurately predict the amount of the change. The study concludes that firms involved in tax disputes appear to strategically disclose by predicting possible changes to reserves and rarely forecasting an amount. While this study suggests regular non-compliance with the look-forward disclosure, results are also consistent with firms having extreme uncertainty regarding anticipated settlements opting to disclose less rather than incorrectly.
Non-compliance and lack of disclosure clarity exist in the FIN 48 setting, but their effect on users of financial statements (including academic researchers) is unclear. Furthermore, no systematic evidence exists regarding the extent of disclosure variation (or the lack of variation) after the year of adoption because it requires substantial time on the part of the researchers to read through each disclosure. It is possible that the variation may have decreased post adoption as the fear that FIN 48 information would be useful to the taxing authority declined (Compliance Week, 2009 of issues pertaining to firms' tax planning and financial reporting behavior. Of particular relevance for our paper, the authors asked "What effect will FIN 48 have (or has it had) on your firm's willingness to take aggressive tax positions?" and then, followed-up with "If FIN 48 will reduce your company's willingness to be tax aggressive, why?" Over 57% of firms indicated that their willingness to engage in aggressive tax planning would decrease as a result of FIN 48.
Consistent with some capital market costs, they report that public firms were significantly more likely to change their tax planning behavior than private firms (60% v. 47%, respectively). Of the firms that answered that FIN 48 would change their tax aggressiveness, 48% answered that their tax aggressiveness would change because they believed that FIN 48 represented a potential "road map" to the IRS. Thirty-two percent of firms also believed that tax aggressiveness under FIN 48
would increase the risk of a later financial statement restatement. Overall, Dunbar et al. (2009) and Graham et al. (2011) suggest that firms were concerned that the disclosures under FIN 48
would provide the IRS (in particular) with details regarding their uncertain tax positions.
Changes in firm behavior are also suggested by papers that investigate state and local tax settlement activity and tax receipts around FIN 48 adoption. FIN 48 clarifies that nexus issues represent uncertain tax positions. Nexus is of significant concern in the state and local tax area because nexus issues are often fuzzy (see Wells and McFadden-Wade, 2007 Interestingly, it appears that the IRS initially intended to exhibit restraint when requesting FIN 48 work papers (see Coder, 2008; Coder, 2009 ). Yet, consistent with Mills et al. (2010) , 33 The model makes several assumptions that are not consistent with the actual FIN 48 reporting environment. For instance, the model assumes that there is only one tax authority and one tax position, which implies that the tax authority has complete information regarding the taxpayer's uncertainty. However, as the purpose of the model is to determine the 'worst case scenario' regarding the effects of FIN 48 on the taxpayer's interaction with the taxing authority, these assumptions do not limit the message of the study.
Coder (2009) discusses evidence which suggests that the IRS has been using the FIN 48 disclosures to select firms for audit. Although the FIN 48 reserve appears to be useful in the risk assessment of a particular audit selection (see Klotsche, Traubenberg, and Hollingsworth, 2010 ), it appears that the IRS views the FIN 48 disclosure as not particularly helpful in audit selection because it often aggregates a variety of tax positions as well as across several jurisdictions.
Recently, the IRS has shown some lack of restraint as it has issued the new Schedule UTP ("Uncertain Tax VI.
Other issues
There are also several themes in the academic literature that do not address specific issues surrounding the efficacy of FIN 48. For example, researchers have begun to study whether the UTB captures the notion of "tax aggressiveness" and whether the UTB has a role in tax director compensation.
a. Executive compensation
There is much interest in the academic literature in understanding whether the compensation of management (e.g., the tax director) explains cross-sectional variation in firms' tax aggressiveness. Authors conjecture that FIN 48 may represent an assessment of the riskiness of firms' tax strategies. If this is the case, then the UTB may be an effective tool to evaluate the potential pay-off to risky tax strategies undertaken by management. De Waegenaere et al. (2010) shows theoretically that the optimal contract features a bonus for reducing the firm's GAAP effective tax rate (ETR), but a penalty for generating an increase to the UTB. Brown et al. (2010) examines CEO/CFO bonus payments from 2007 to 2009 and finds that bonuses are increasing in tax performance (low cash ETRs) but only in firms with low tax risk (low UTB).
b. Determinants of UTBs
There are also several studies that examine the cross-sectional determinants of levels and changes in the unrecognized tax benefit. Many of these studies are exploratory in nature and are generally interested in understanding whether FIN 48 provides information that is related to the nature and extent of firms' tax avoidance activities (e.g., Alexander, Ettredge, Stone, and Sun, 2009; Campbell, 2010; Cazier, Rego, Tian, and Wilson, 2009; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt, 2011) .
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, the findings of the academic literature on FIN 48 are evaluated to ascertain whether the new standard improved financial reporting. Overall, academic evidence suggests that FIN 48 a) increased the amount of information regarding UTBs available to investors, b)
improved the comparability of the UTB balances, and c) improved the consistency of UTB accounting practices. The literature also suggests that there have been changes in behavior due to FIN 48; particularly associated with the potential increased costs of allowing the taxing authorities to have more information regarding firms' tax uncertainties. However, the academic literature has not yet been able to quantify the cost of taxing authorities' additional scrutiny.
Although the literature has found that the market impounds the information in the UTB into price, the positive association between the UTB and price is surprising and warrants further attention. Finally, a number of working papers that examine firms' FIN 48 disclosure practices find significant variation in the quality and completeness of the UTB footnote disclosures. If disclosure practices are too varied, then strides in increasing the comparability of UTB balances may yield little benefit to shareholders.
